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NOMADIC SUBJECTIVITY AND CRITICISIZM 
OF THE CONCEPTION OF IDENTITY: A POST-STRUCTURAL 






Abstract. Rosi Braidotti, a prominent feminist philosopher, has contributed to the 
poststructuralist critique of identity with the concept of “nomadic subjectivity”. The 
concept of nomadic subjectivity is an important reference in the critique of the structural 
process of identity. This concept is a kind of criticism that focuses on the possibility of 
transition among identities, rather than an anarchist attitude in the sense of rejecting 
identity. For Braidotti, identity has a structural functioning that prevents the 
metamorphosis of the subjectivity. By referring to the Deleuzian nomadic philosophy, 
Braidotti tries to open a new path for a transition among identities. For Braidotti, identity 
is not a notion that symbolizes the inter-subject hierarchy, but the contingent possibility 
of becoming a subject. The contingency of the identity, then, means that the notion of 
subject is not completed and has not a stable structure. This idea constitutes one of the 
obvious consensus between Braidotti and post-structural philosophy. This article aims to 
discuss the poststructuralist critiques of identity by focusing on Bradiotti's thoughts. The 
basic assertion of this article is that Braidotti's conceptualization of nomadic subjectivity 
has a poststructuralist content.  





There has always been a tense relationship between post-structural 
philosophy and the concept of identity. According to the post-
structuralist philosophy, the concept of identity contains an ambiguity 
and this ambiguity occurs because identity cannot embrace existence 




overlapping between identity – naming existence to become cognizable – 
and existence – the concrete form of living. Therefore, some theorists in 
post-structuralism offer a term which refers to a path of destroying the 
structural forms identifying the being. This term refers to the concept of 
"becoming", which corresponds to a more unsteady and more 
contingent understanding, rather than the concept of identity that 
cannot entirely identify existence. This term is mostly used in the works 
of Deleuze, who tried to think about becoming outside identity or any 
structural form surrounding the being. For him, the notion of identity 
identifies the subject according to the transcendent categories, and so, 
the subject cannot belong to itself. However, for Deleuze, there is a 
possibility to escape from identity and its “capture” by separating the 
subjectivity from any transcendence identifier. For him, this possibility 
is bringing the notion of the body back to philosophy again. Deleuze, 
who is a follower of Spinoza, therefore argues that “we do not know 
what a body is capable of” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 257).  
The body in Deleuze, and mainly in post-structuralist philosophy, 
refers to opening existence to a new path by which no transcendental 
signifier could capture the being. So, the meaning and function of the 
body is to unify the meaning and living of a body since the notion of the 
body reflects the concrete unity of subjectivity and existence (May, 2003: 
140-143). In other words, the meaning of the body in Deleuzian sense is 
that the subjectivity can no longer be coded by a transcendental signifier 
(Deleuze, 1990: 228). So, the body functions as a preventer of a 
transcendental identifier which defines the subjectivity although it does 
not belong to the subject.  
What we must realize in post-structuralism is that the notion of the 
body is mostly thought of as the possibility of rejecting the 
transcendental power which tries to capture the beings and defines them 
under the title of identity. So, identity is also the rejection of the body 
which refers to the possibility of escaping from the identical process that 
causes power to be able to arise. Therefore, in many post-structural 
studies, the body is named as a signifier of “new politics” (Massumi, 
2002: 11; Hansen, 2004: 591-595) which offers a thinking of the body as 
carrier of becoming paths because the body is mainly thought of as a 
possibility of revealing the unstable nature of the structure. For post-
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structuralism, the structure is only possible by hiding the bodily 
subjectivity so that it can be identified with a transcendental signifier. 
The criticism of the notion of identity therefore refers to putting forward 
the more unforeseeable elements of existence. This unforeseeable element is 
the body itself and the body is one of the reference concepts frequently 
referred to in the post-structural critique of the notion of identity.  
The post-structural critique of the notion of identity requires 
emphasizing the contingent nature of the body. The contingency of the body 
invalidates the claim of completeness of identity. That is why post-structural 
critics of identity mostly focus on feminism and contemporary queer 
studies. Rosi Braidotti, who will be broadly discussed in this study, has 
developed critical arguments on contemporary problems in criticism of 
both identity and feminist studies.  
Braidotti is a theoretician that should be examined carefully not 
only for her contributions to feminist theories but also with the 
perspective she has developed on the issue of identity. Although she has 
not specifically focused on identity, her theories are very useful and 
efficient for handling them as theoretical tools in criticism of identity. It 
can be said that Braidotti has been included in these discussions because 
of her new perspectives on the term of “subjectivity”. The notion of 
subjectivity is handled quite distinctly in her work, because Braidotti 
focuses on the concept of a living body, rather than on the concept of 
abstract identity. The notion of abstract identity points out a Deleuzian 
notion here; because, for Braidotti, the notion of identity always means 
an abstract existence which is alienated from the living body. That is 
why she tries to solve the problem of abstract identity with a concrete 
phenomenon – the body. The notion of the body, in her works, is 
presented as a negation of abstract identity because the body represents 
a contingency which cannot be encompassed by any abstractness. So, the 
notion of the body emerges as a possibility that offers to go beyond 
identity. The potentials of the body involving going beyond identity are 
the indications of why the body tries to be captured by identity. Like 
Spinoza, Braidotti believes that any abstraction always tries to capture 
the living body in order to immobilize it under a transcendency. This 
transcendency works as a splint to re-localize the body once it can escape 




handled through an idea examining the possibilities of an existence 
beyond identity.  
Braidotti’s arguments on identity resemble the post-structural 
thoughts because both of them tend to handle the notion of subjectivity 
beyond structural signifiers, like the conception of identity. Although 
most of her works focus on feminism, Braidotti also discusses the 
possibilities of going beyond identities – which are given –, because, for 
her, the conception of identity is an issue of “to become” not “to situate” 
in a pre-determined existence. Like the post-structuralists, Braidotti 
intends to show that abstracted identity, which is thought to encompass 
the living body, actually has an inevitable lack of completeness. This 
lack of completeness emerges from an inevitable contingency; and this 
contingency can be named as the “potentiality of a body”. Braidotti 
brings back the question that Spinoza, and after him, Deleuze once 
asked: “We do not even know what a body is capable of…”. For 
Braidotti, the body shows the boundaries of abstracted identity on the 
one hand, and the unpredictable becoming of existence on the other. It 
means that the body and its contingent potentiality signify the lack of 
completeness of identity; because the notion of identity can perceive 
itself as “complete” only by making the body foreseeable. So, there is a 
radical distinction between identity and the body, and Braidotti tries to 
discuss this distinction by examining the problem of subjectivity.  
In this study, my aim is to discuss the problem of identity within 
the framework of post-structuralism. According to the basic claim of the 
article, only a post-structuralist critique of identity can prove that the 
notion of identity does not have a stable and coherent structure. However, 
such a criticism has to prove that the notion of identity has an inconsistent 
structure in itself due to internal discrepancies. This discrepancy occurs 
because the abstract notion of identity cannot correspond to living 
existence. In other words, there is always a gap between identity and 
existence that cannot be removed, and this gap is the reason why 
identity will always remain unstable. For post-structuralism, this 
instability of identity is also the possibility of “becoming” by which the 
body could exceed abstracted existence. Since Braidotti gives priority to 
the concept of body compared to identity, she should be considered as a 
reference for post-structural critiques on the notion of identity. 
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I. Philosophical Roots of Post-structuralist Critiques of Identity 
 
Revealing the “Instability” of the Structure 
 
Distributed at the intersections of general areas of social theory, 
post-structuralism has mostly been associated with a turn to language in 
social theory (Callinicos, 1999: 266) and with a rejection of universalism 
(Barthes, 1977: 148). Unlike structuralism, post-structuralism refers to 
the instability of meaning (Levi-Strauss, 1963: 34). In structuralism, the 
meaning is understood within a concept of structure which determines 
the scope of comprehending and acting. So, the meaning becomes 
consistent by being immobilized in a structure. The notion of identity 
emerges as the sign of a coherent relation between the meaning and the 
structure. The identity is derived from the meaning that symbolizes the 
stability of the structure. It means that the identity indicates an overlap 
between the structure and the meaning. While structure is a concept that 
shapes people's actions and thoughts, meaning is an ontology that expresses 
the reason for and consistency of the structure (Johnson, 2003: 77). So, in 
this study, the idea that identity emerges as a signifier of the relationship 
between the visible (structure) and the nonvisible (the meaning) will be 
discussed. For this reason, the concept of identity should be understood 
as a meta-narrative in structuralism because a meta-narrative signifies the 
ahistorical overlapping of the abstractness and concreteness. In other words, 
the meta-narrative presents a conflicting overlap between the consistency 
nature of the meaning and the instability nature of the structure.  
The fact that the concept of identity is treated as a meta-narrative 
by post-structuralism is actually based on a simple reason. Since post-
structuralism does not accept the notion of stability or consistency of the 
meaning, it naturally rejects the permanency of the structure (Finlayson and 
Valentine, 2002: 2; Sarup, 1993: 136). According to post-structuralism, 
the structure masks its instability by representing or relating itself in an 
abstract meaning. The structure succeeds in concealing its internal 
incoherence by identifying itself with meaning. The function of the 
meta-narrative is to make the relationship between meaning and structure 
incomprehensible. Therefore, post-structuralism mostly focuses on this 




(concreteness) and the meaning (abstractness) (Belsey, 2002: 73-75). 
However, some methodological aspects should also be regarded in 
order to comprehend the post-structural approaches in philosophy. 
According to the epistemology that post-structuralism is grounded in, 
the structural form of any meaning is disputable because any structure 
is established with linguistic forms that create a signifier coming before 
the object and its signs (Poynton, 1993: 3-4). This means that the 
signifier, as an imaginary representation, has an established meaning 
through language and it has been established before the object which is 
pointed out. The function of the signifier is creating a meaningful 
context in the subject’s consciousness that perceives the object with its 
meaning. Therefore, the structure is established outside of its 
concreteness, or, in other words, the structure gains its meaning by a 
subjective contribution that makes it real.  
The post-structuralist critique of stability depends on an approach 
which claims that no structural form can manifest itself as unified in its 
simple being. These post-structuralist philosophers (such as Foucault, 
Derrida, Lyotard, etc.) argue that no universality can exist because any 
meaningful claim manifesting the “truth” in itself indispensably needs 
an externality through which the universality can perceive itself. In other 
words, the meaning of an abstract universality can only be manifested by 
including the externality which is radically different from the structural 
form of the meaning. As can be understood, the meaning, which manifests 
that it includes the truth, does actually need the radical otherness in 
order to establish itself. So, post-structuralism claims that there can be no 
structural form manifesting itself as stable, unified and eternal because it 
always needs a radical externality which is different from itself.  
According to post-structuralism, the notion of truth – which 
represents the universality in itself – is usually understood as “not a 
property of sentences or thoughts, as language might lead one to 
suppose” (Frege, 1979, 234). In other words, we can understand that any 
structural form is actually instable through trying to conceptualize itself 
as a linguistic form. Because post-structuralism basically claims that 
linguistic form is the basis of any social structure (including relational 
concepts); therefore, it should be analyzed in its functional way. 
Through linguistic conceptualizing, we will notice that the meaning 
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does always depend on its nothingness; this means that any structural 
form can be followed in its contingency because the meaning always 
includes a part which is not there. In other words, the language itself 
establishes the boundary between what-is-there and what-is-not-there. 
Post-structuralism therefore claims that any structural form consists of 
instability because the structural form owes its existence to its radical 
externality. As a result of this, since this radical externality is 
interiorized to the structure, the meaning of universality gains its unity 
by means of this externality.  
 
 
“Deconstruction” of the Structure  
 
As has been stated above, post-structuralism depends on many 
theories in order to reveal the instability of the structural form, and the 
most leading of these methods is the deconstruction. According to 
Derrida, deconstruction is a critical method which asserts that meanings, 
metaphysical constructs, and hierarchical oppositions are always 
rendered unstable by their dependence on ultimately arbitrary signifiers 
(Derrida, 1997: 162). According to Derrida, every structure has a 
hierarchical context in itself, but this hierarchy is not represented in the 
structure itself (Derrida, 1987: 14-18) because the excluded part of the 
hierarchy is externalized from the structure, though it has been 
interiorized within the structure. In other words, the structure is 
established by excluding its otherness; however, this exclusion is always 
interiorized or represented inside the structure. So, the excluded part is 
both inside and outside; therefore, the structure does not have a 
consistency because its establishment depends on a radical exteriority 
which cannot be totally interiorized.  
According to the topic which this study attempts to explore, 
identity as a kind of universality indicates that the stability of the 
structure must be inevitably instable in itself because the structure is 
established by its excluded part. This is an indicator of a paradox, 
because identity, which has been thought of as a unity-in-itself, has a 
contradictory context due to its dependency on exclusion. Therefore, the 




which is excluded from the structural form. It indicates that the 
structure always contains a meaningless element (or the meaning cannot 
be contained within the structure) because the missing part (subsidiary 
element) of the structure must always be outside. For Derrida, the 
reason why there is always an inconsistency inside the structure is 
because the excluded part of the structure must be represented inside 
the structure. In this context, any structural form can represent itself as a 
universality only by manifesting that the missing part which completes 
the structure does belong to the structure itself.  
So, deconstruction, which Derrida uses to reveal the inconsistency 
of the structure, gains its meaning and function in here because 
deconstruction tries to show the inconsistencies inside the structure by 
arguing that there cannot be any meta-narratives which can be related to 
the structure (Stocker, 2006: 183-188). What is criticized by Derrida is not 
the term of the meaning itself, but the transcendency of the structure 
that is identified with the meaning.  
Derrida’s thoughts on deconstruction have opened new paths for 
post-structuralist critiques on the concept of universal forms including 
the notion of identity. Deconstruction, which means revealing the 
inconsistencies of the structure, has mostly been used as a tool for 
criticizing meta-narratives in social and political contexts (Williams, 
2005: 25-27). Moreover, the concept of identity has therefore been 
positioned in these kinds of critiques because the term of identity is seen 
as the meta-context of the structure. Post-structuralist critiques therefore 
focus on the deconstruction of identity because identity is seen as a 
structure in itself. According to contemporary post-structural theorists, 
the deconstruction does also have an ethical task besides its 
epistemological function (Koch, 2007: 11). This ethical task implies that 
the ethics does not have a meaning in itself, but rather that the ethics 
should be seen as a process by which the meaning can be deconstructed 
in order to reveal its contingent and arbitrary establishment. In other 
words, as Critchley emphasizes, deconstruction is a kind of critical 
reading which always considers that the structure does not have a 
consistency in itself (Critchley, 2014: 2). Therefore, critical reading of the 
structure through deconstruction makes it easier to understand that the 
establishment of the meaning is definitely a political issue (Fagan, 2013: 94). 
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The meaning of being political means that the hierarchy which the 
meaning carries is not a philosophical matter. In other words, the 
hierarchy concealed within the meaning forms the identity of the 
structure, and this is the politics of the meaning because the meaning is 
the sign of the hierarchy in the structure, whereas identity is the social 
counterpart of this hierarchy. So, identity emerges by normalization of 
the exclusion and, moreover, identity is the identification of the 
structure with that exclusion.  
The post-structural critique of the concept of identity is more 
apparent in the conception of language. For post-structuralism, 
language is a tool of legitimation of the discourses which determine the 
scope of communicating (Brown, 1995: 20). So, the language functions to 
perpetuate the structural process of the relations among social actors. 
However, these actors gain their subjectivities by relating themselves 
with the pre-determined structural forms of positions on which their 
acts become recognizable. Language here works as a conjunction 
showing the correlation between the meaning and signifier which are 
both interiorized within the structure. So, the language itself is 
understood as a manifestation of the exclusionary acts of the identities 
which express social positions. For post-structuralism, expressions 
within the language should not be evaluated as autonomous parts of 
grammar; rather, they are the reflections of the exclusions represented in 
the structural forms. This is exactly what Derrida once said “dualities” 
were (1973: 57). Dualities are the representation of the inconsistency of 
the meaning identified with the structure. They also indicate the 
exclusionary nature of the meaning which depends on a radical 
externality in order to perceive and demonstrate itself as a totality-in-
itself. The paradox here is that the missing part of the identity must be 
outside of the identity. According to post-structuralism, any structural 
form can perceive itself as a whole by externalizing a component that 
completes it. This is an indication that the externalization process is 
completely arbitrary and political because the externalization needs to 
be formed under an appearance. This function is like a mirror because 
the structural form can perceive its totality in the face of the thing 
externalized. Therefore, the function of externalization is to emphasize 




in the externalized component. It is supposed that the missing part does 
belong to the externalized part, and this idea establishes the perception 
of the completeness of the structure. That is why post-structuralism 
focuses on the hierarchy in linguistic concepts because these concepts 
reflect the externalization relations. Many post-structuralist theorists 
tend to criticize the discursive function of the hierarchy by following the 
dualistic forms in the text (Leitch, 1992). Barthes, for example, argues 
that the text is not constructed by an “Author-God” (Barthes, 1978: 145) 
which means that the meaning cannot be contained by the structure – in 
other words, the identity which refers to the unity of both abstractness 
and concreteness becomes invalid because the phenomenon which gives 
the meaning of the text is outside of it (Lavers, 2004: 146). In other 
words, the meaning can only be comprehended by realizing the missing 
and external part of the text. So, the meaning and function of the 
structure can only be understood with externalized components outside 
of the structure.  
 
 
II. Braidotti and ‘New’ Post-Structural Criticism  
 
Post-Structural Background  
 
The main purpose of this section is to argue that post-structural 
philosophy and Rosi Braidotti’s criticisms of identity politics (including 
subjectivity) have much in common. Both post-structuralism and Braidotti 
claim that the identity representing existence (unique or the whole) is 
handled as a unity-in-itself; however, this causes comprehending the 
“other” – neglected part of existence – as hierarchically externalized. So, 
criticism of identity needs to depend on evaluating and considering the 
meaning of the other in the establishment of existence. This paradigm 
also includes the criticism of a process in which the social and political 
forms are structured under the notion of a specific identity that 
identifies the meaning of the structure by externalization. In other 
words, criticism of the notion of identity does not really mean to criticize 
the concept of identity itself, but rather to criticize the process which 
causes comprehending the structure as a unity-in-itself. The basic point 
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of this criticism focuses on the process including dualisms and hiding 
the externalization as well. So, the post-structural critiques of identity 
try to investigate the missing parts belonging to the structural forms 
which have been externalized. For post-structuralism, the root of 
identity is the missing and externalized parts of the structure. According 
to post-structuralism, criticism of identity should focus on the parts that 
are left out of the structure. The main part establishing identity is this 
externality, since it gives the meaning of the structure which signifies 
the unity-in-itself.  
When post-structural criticism is taken into consideration, it can be 
said that the thing that gives meaning to identity must be sought in the 
place where externality is produced. Braidotti cares exactly about this 
criticism and she tries to imagine a new type of existence which obviates 
an identity process that always needs to depend on externalization in 
order to establish itself. In order to transform this critique into a 
coherent philosophical system, Braidotti has proposed a new conceptual 
set which is called "nomadic subjects". By taking the term “nomadic” 
from Deleuze, Braiditti follows a new conception of existence which 
closes itself to transcendental identity and can open itself to new concepts 
of being to become irrepressible. Nomadic, here, means a Guattarian 
perspective which is called “lines of flight” (Guattari, 2016: 122). Lines of 
flight represent a counter-cultural perspective which was afterwards 
used by Deleuze to criticize the normalization process. It represents a 
rejection of being named by identity. In other words, lines of flight refer to 
a path in which existence gains its meaning not by identifying itself with 
an identity (Deleuze, 2007: 11-12). Rather, it gains its meaning by 
opening itself to new concepts of becoming. Braidotti cares about this 
thought and offers an ontological plane in which the concept of 
becoming is to be comprehensible. Her definition of “nomadic subject” 
is therefore important because she uses this term to enlarge the 
Deleuzian idea which includes post-structural components.  
Deleuze was always concerned with “how can the change occur?” 
The change, here, means representing a shift from the present which is 
related to a universality. In other words, change can occur because the 
inconsistency has already been discovered. Deleuze therefore claims that 




philosophy relates with both post-structuralism and feminism because 
the Deleuzian idea shows that change in existence may be possible only 
if the inconsistency in existence can be discovered. Inconsistencies cause 
us to realize that the being does not consist of an external and 
transcendental signifier which gives meaning to the structural form. So, 
in other words, the Deleuzian idea actually contains a “body 
philosophy” which exteriorizes the external signifiers which consist of 
instabilities. According to Deleuze, inspired by Spinoza, it is only the 
body which can contain both meaning and being in its existence. In 
other words, Deleuze rejects any representative forms of identical 
structures because they alienate the body (living part of existence) from 
its subjectivity (meaningful part of existence). However, Deleuze is of 
the opinion that both the living and meaningful parts of existence must 
be associated.  
Ultimately, for Deleuze and Guattari, all thought is a “becoming, a 
double becoming, rather than the attribute of a Subject and the 
representation of a Whole” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 49). They try 
to imagine an existence which does not alienate the being from its living 
form. It is rather a criticism of the notion of identity because they reject 
the idea of representation which defines the living in a transcendental 
context. This point of view is also represented in Braidotti’s philosophy. 
Braidotti has inherited a Deleuzian thought and tries to connect the 
Deleuzian idea of becoming to the actual problems in philosophy. Her 
suggestions mostly focus on problematizing how bodies can escape 
from transcendental contexts which try to intervene and define them. 
Braidotti therefore calls on Deleuze to imagine how bodies can establish 
themselves without performing any reference to a structural form. What 
Braidotti intends is the creation of the possibilities of existence that can 
be realized without being bound to any notion of identity, and this is the 
main reason why she should be handled as a post-structuralist 
philosopher because she tries to explore how the new concepts of being 
have settled in our age and why we should focus on revealing their 
potentialities that show us the possibility of becoming (Braidotti, 2010: 5). 
Braidotti’s post-structuralism is also seen in the critiques of the notion of 
transcendental contexts and universal codes which define the being 
outside of the subjects. She therefore tries to conceptualize the “nomadic 
NOMADIC SUBJECTIVITY AND CRITICISIZM OF THE CONCEPTION OF IDENTITY: 
A POST-STRUCTURAL READING OF ROSI BRAIDOTTI 
39 
subjectivity” in order to claim that it is still possible to think and live 
politically without any need to refer to any transcendental codes which 
are expected to define the being. This idea establishes the post-structural 
background of Braidotti’s philosophy because she does not only try to 
explore the possibilities of escaping, but rather, she also seeks to imagine 
the transitions among identities, sexualities and, generally, everything 
about structural-universal codes which are thought of as unique and 
isolated in themselves. In her words,  
 
“to identify lines of flight, that is to say, a creative alternative space 
of becoming that would fall not between the mobile/immobile, the 
resident/the foreigner distinction, but within all these categories. 
The point is neither to dismiss nor to glorify the status of marginal, 
alien others, but to find a more accurate, complex location for a 
transformation of the very terms of their specification and of our 
political interaction” (Bradiotti, 1994: 242).  
 
 
What is Nomadic Subjectivity? 
 
In her collection of essays, Braidotti declares that her aim is to 
“develop and evoke a vision of (…) subjectivity in a nomadic mode” 
(Braidotti 1994:1). For Braidotti, the “nomadic subject” is a new 
epistemological and political entity to be defined and affirmed in the 
confrontation of multiple differences, in class, race and sexual preference 
(Braidotti 1994:30). Braidotti uses the concept of “nomadic subject” not 
only to criticize the conception of identity, but also, she uses this term 
for imagining the possibility of an ethical existence. This principle of 
ethical existence is based on the rejection of the externalization which is 
essential to the concept of identity. For Braidotti, the conception of 
identity is always a matter of hierarchies because it contains a 
“dominancy” in social relations (Braidotti, 2014: 170). However, the 
ethical rejection of the conception of identity is based on the idea of 
“virtual” inherited from the Deleuzian approach. Braidotti uses the term 
“virtual” in order to define the scope of the ethical dimension of 




opening up spaces where virtual possibilities can be actualized” 
(Braidotti, 2006: 167). The meaning of the virtual is because of its 
unforeseeable and, more importantly, its unrelated nature, which means 
that the virtual one cannot be encoded, but it can only be defined in its context.  
For Braidotti, the conception of identity encodes the differences 
under a framework, so the uniqueness becomes meaningless within the 
framework. Encoding, here, refers to a Deleuzian approach which has 
previously been discussed in A Thousand Plateaus with Felix Guattari. As 
they argued, encoding is an opportunity to make anything become 
explainable (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 86). The encoding process here 
means that any singularity can no longer be identified in its own 
particularity but is linked to a universal notion. With reference to 
Deleuze and Guattari, Braidotti focuses on the concept of subjectivity. 
The conception of “nomadic subject” reflects the desire to get out of an 
encoding process that closes the lines of flight, as Deleuze emphasizes. 
Braidotti, therefore, tries to imagine how these lines of flight can be 
actualized. This is where Braidotti starts to criticize the Deleuzian notion 
of nomadism which only reflects what should be done. According to 
her, the main problem is that there is no worthwhile answer reflecting 
the possibilities in a social context.  
Braidotti appreciates the Deleuzian notion of becoming which 
reflects a possibility to be out of the encoding process. However, the 
main problem for Braidotti is that the notion of becoming in Deleuzian 
thought is a kind of “empty signifier” which should then be indicated in 
a subjectivity. Braidotti criticizes Deleuzian thought because according 
to her, although Deleuze succeeded in pointing out the process of 
encoding, he never really tried to enlarge the idea of nomadism 
including a subjectivity (Braidotti, 1993b: 46). Yet, Deleuze created a 
radical shift in Western philosophy because he reversed the positions 
identified with specified subjectivities. In Anti-Oedipus, which was 
written with the associate of Guattari, Deleuze tried to enlighten the idea 
of becoming by proposing a “minor philosophy” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
2004b: 363). The minor philosophy is a way of invitation by which the 
externalized part of philosophy is re-called. However, this invitation is 
not to create an alternative philosophy including new regimes of 
dualisms. Rather, their prior aim was to create a philosophical thought 
NOMADIC SUBJECTIVITY AND CRITICISIZM OF THE CONCEPTION OF IDENTITY: 
A POST-STRUCTURAL READING OF ROSI BRAIDOTTI 
41 
that worked without depending on dualities (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 
173). That is why they tried to exemplify the types of becoming: the 
becoming-woman, becoming-animal, becoming-etc. These examples of 
becoming signify that philosophy should not focus on creating a complete 
being which naturally tends to exteriorize the otherness which cannot 
belong to this complete structure. Rather, becoming should be a fluid plane 
in which “all the other points melt together” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 224). 
So, they actually try to imagine an existence without any singular being, but 
where all types of existence melt together. Braidotti criticizes this thought, 
although she appreciates the nomadic philosophy. According to her, the 
missing part of the Deleuzian nomadism is that of the possibilities which 
are identified with singular subjects.  
 
 
The Becoming-Woman, or Escaping from Identity 
 
Becoming is always a matter of creating lines of flight to escape out 
of bodies that are named by transcendental structures. The Deleuzian 
notion of becoming always tends to imagine becoming without any 
identity or singularity. That is why the figurative notion of becoming 
cannot be represented by any figures in the Deleuzian sense. Braidotti’s 
criticism here occurs because she argues that becoming does not really 
need to be anonymous (Braidotti, 1996: 305). Rather, singularity should 
become comprehensible in order to reflect the possibility of becoming, 
or, in other words, representation of singularity can actualize the virtual. 
Braidotti actually differs from Deleuze with an epistemological position. 
Braidotti gives priority to the actuality rather than thinking about the 
possibility of the virtual. That is why she insists on the thinking 
“Woman” rather than rejecting any conception that identifies singularity. 
According to her, thinking through the conception of woman does not 
mean accepting the transcendency, because the conception of “woman” 
here can refer to a point that signifies the limits of the embracing 
capacity of identity. That is why Braidotti claims that becoming gains its 
meaning only by representing the hierarchy belonging to different 
points. In other words, in the Deleuzian sense the becoming-woman 




position (Braidotti, 1993b: 46). So, the main problem is not to think about 
the possibility of becoming, but rather, about the subjects representing 
becoming in themselves, in their acts or in their thinking. 
The importance of the subject is the main theme of Braidotti’s and 
she emphasizes the actual forms of becoming. Unlike Deleuze, Braidotti 
focuses on the question of “how” and, more importantly, “who”, which 
refers to the problem of concreteness. According to her, criticism of the 
concept of identity should focus on a possibility and opportunity to 
think about counter-subjectivities which may cause identity to become 
inadequate and affirm the differences as well (Braidotti, 2007: 66). In 
other words, it is not enough to affirm the differences in a philosophical 
proposal, but rather, the differences should be affirmed in a subjectivity. 
In Derridean sense, the difference can only be seen in an irreducible 
context and this should not be in a philosophical way because logos, which 
are the sovereign center of philosophy, can relate every differentiation 
by using abstraction. Therefore, Braidotti tries to pull the conception 
from the philosophical plane and direct it to the vital components 
themselves. The becoming-woman, then, is not an abstraction of 
thinking about how to escape from identity. Rather, it should be the 
concretization of the virtual which is the possibility of becoming.  
The distinction between philosophy – or thinking (abstraction) – and 
life – vitality – suggests that concreteness is a notion that must be 
represented in life. For Braidotti, escaping from identity is not something 
that can be possible only by abstraction. Rather, it starts with querying 
the conditions that made us. These conditions are not abstracted 
components of our existence; on the contrary, they are identified with 
our singular representations – such as bodily establishments and the 
performatives that we re-organize in the face of society (Butler, 1997: 44). 
That is why identity is something “that we left behind us” (Braidotti, 
1994: 59). The possibility of leaving our identity behind is a figuration 
that calls for a new vitalism: an alternative path to live, to think or to act. 
This figuration must include a subjectivity because the subject is the 
representation of empathy (Braidotti, 1994: 35). The empathy here refers 
to a type of becoming in Braidotti’s sense because the term “empathy” 
means an opening to the exteriorized fact. However, for Braidotti, the 
notion of empathy refers to a becoming in an actual way by which 
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subjectivity is organized mutually, because empathy means an 
affectivity that affects the subject to act without getting any permission 
of the structural identity. So, the subject becomes a subject by including 
itself in the event. In other words, subjectivity only occurs by exceeding 
the structural forms of identity and opening itself to the contingency of 
the event. For Braidotti, the possibility of exceeding identity is 
representing this transposition in a bodily context (2006: 44). Bodily 
representation of transpositions indicates the actualizing of the virtual, 
and that is the ethics of the embodiment because exceeding identity 
requires not creating new dualisms in thought, but it suggests 
perceiving the process in vital facts. Braidotti here agrees with Deleuze 
because dualism occurs when the subject holds itself off from the 
outside. Thought functions as a separative by which the subject can 
perceive the differences and the distance between the outside and itself.  
It can be said that Braidotti gives priority to the term of subjectivity 
(becoming), rather than to the subject implying a constant and complete 
being. Her affirmation of subjectivity can be seen in the term of 
embodiment and she uses this term to discuss the actual forms of 
becoming. Embodiment, according to her, does not refer to a distance 
among the subjects, but rather, it is the creation of a new subjectivity 
which contains different forms of subjects. The becoming-woman is not 
thought of as the imagination of a transcendental conception of 
“Woman”; rather, it means an event in which the self can perceive itself 
much more from its present existence. In that event, the self can exceed 
its currency which cannot be a reference for the subject. So, the ethics 
and function of the event is the possibility of creating the “new” 
subjectivities, not by imagining or abstracting a conception, but by 
vitalizing its potentiality. So, it should be said that the criticism of 
identity should focus on creating new vital zones in which the structural 





The post-structural critique of identity follows a very different 




reducible relationship between subject and action, post-structuralism 
suggests that there is always an irreducible gap. According to post-
structuralism, the concept of identity gains its meaning by creating a 
process in which existence and its abstract representation are rigidly 
bound together. Identity, which demonstrates the relation between the 
being and its image, causes singularity to be reducible by the embracing 
power of transcendency. Identity is an indication that articulative 
interventions start to define the content of the being. In other words, 
identity shows that the being cannot define itself according to its own 
totality and singularity. Rather, it indicates a process by which the being 
must refer to a transcendency determining the comprehensible scope of 
the being.  
The establishment of identity necessitates the notion of “the other” 
which signifies a gap where the subject can be produced as a 
completeness. Externalizing the other reveals the subject (I) as complete 
and sovereign. Derrida exemplifies this establishment in revealing the 
Logos which means the sovereign paradigm of Western philosophy. The 
post-structural critiques of identity resemble Derrida’s criticisms 
because these critiques focus on the idea of the completeness which is 
immanent in structural forms. According to these critiques, the concept 
of identity does have a gap which causes an instability for the structural 
form. The structure must hide the gap inside it in order to demonstrate 
itself as complete and unified. Thus, the post-structural criticisms of 
identity focus on the possibility of thinking about new subjectivities by 
investigating the reason for instabilities.  
Rosi Braidotti finds this possibility in thinking of a new type of 
subjectivity which is also called “nomadic subjects”. Nomadic 
subjectivity is a type of becoming which does not leave any gap between 
differences. Braidotti insists on thinking about nomadism with the idea 
of becoming because she never wishes to think of subjectivity in terms of 
“I”, which refers to a completeness in itself and is external to all 
differences. Rather, in a post-structuralist way, she aims to designate a 
path in which the subjects can transpose each other. Therefore, she 
exemplifies the ethical function of the ethics of empathy because 
through empathy, subjects can exceed their current beings which are 
externalized from the others. Braidotti says that empathy leads to a 
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meeting point where subjects no longer perceive the other as an 
externalized part of the world. She therefore aims to put forward the 
vital and actual potentialities of life which may be the possibility of 
transposing and, more importantly, exceeding the identities. To 
summarize Braidotti’s considerations, it can be said that, once identity 
can be left behind existence, it can open itself to becoming by which it 
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